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INTRODUCTION 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush declared 
that the United States was fighting a “War on Terror.” Congress followed 
with a declaration labeled an Authorization for Use of Military Force 
Against Terrorists. (AUMF).2 These two differently worded declarations 
have generated a series of confusions. The first concerned the existence of a 
state of war because the Congressional declaration used the term “use of 
military force,” rather than the word “war.” In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,3 the 
plurality opinion noted that the AUMF authorized the President to “‘use all 
necessary and appropriate force against [ ] nations, organizations, or 
persons’” associated with the September 11th attacks,4 but never directly 
stated that AUMF constituted a declaration of war. The opinion did refer to 
the war power in the course of determining that Hamdi’s detention was 
lawful based on the AUMF. Thereafter, the opinion addressed the process 
due to Hamdi—presumably a U.S. citizen—who had been captured on the 
battlefield but was being held in the United States.  
In the opinion of this author, the Court’s treatment of due process, as 
well as habeas corpus, both in Hamdi and Rasul v. Bush5 confused the 
realms of war and domestic law enforcement.6 Prior to, and since those 
decisions, disagreements about fighting foreign terrorism have turned on 
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whether the appropriate response involves “war” or “law enforcement.” In 
this author’s view, the Bush Administration was correct to treat the attacks 
as acts of war, rather than crimes; but wrong to label the U.S. response a 
“War on Terror.” This rhetorical confusion seems to indicate that within the 
Bush Administration there were conflicting understandings concerning the 
Constitution’s allocation of powers in war as distinguished from law 
enforcement. 
 John Bellinger, a State Department Legal Adviser during the Bush 
Administration, confirmed the difficulties surrounding the use of rhetoric 
related to the war the U.S. when he declared: “Our discussions with our 
allies contributed to convergence of our views on many issues. Part of what 
separated us was rhetoric.”7 The issue that underlies this conflict over the 
rhetoric, however, involved more than a simple choice of words: 
The U.S. references to a “Global War on Terror,” for example, were often 
perceived to suggest that we thought war was the principal, or even only, 
framework for countering terrorism, and that we could lawfully use force 
against all terrorists at all times wherever they might be located. Other 
countries understandably bristled at this notion. On the other side, our 
allies often appeared to argue that combating terrorism was only a law 
enforcement matter and challenged the readily defensible proposition that 
States can use force against terrorist groups that attack or imminently 
threaten to attack them.8 
  This difference over the proper response to terrorism—whether through 
war or through law enforcement—is, as discussed below, fundamental. The 
State Department blurred the division, responding “that the ‘Global War on 
Terror’ was not a legal term of art, and that in many instances, law 
enforcement can be the appropriate legal paradigm for addressing terrorist 
threats.”9  In these discussions, the State Department was attempting to 
negotiate a consensus and avoid conflict with our allies. Nevertheless, this 
lack of clarity on the fundamental issue of war versus law enforcement, 
which divided elements of the Bush Administration, made it difficult to 
communicate to the American public and the world a coherent approach to 
the “war.” 
 The State Department, however, apparently succeeded in engaging our 
allies in the kind of reasoned and reciprocal persuasion that was lacking in 
Congress. Bellinger said, “[o]ur allies, on the other hand, began to accept 
the notion that [the United States is and] can be in armed conflict with a 
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transnational terrorist group such as al Qaeda.”10 On detention and other 
issues, “the United States moved closer to our allies’ positions partly as a 
result of U.S. domestic legal developments, including new legislation such 
as the Detainee Treatment Act and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rasul, 
Hamdi, and Hamdan, and Boumediene.”11 The State Department must have 
made the case for war, because “our allies acknowledged that the existing 
criminal laws and international humanitarian rules, such as the Geneva 
Conventions, [do] not neatly apply to the new threats posed by 
[transnational terrorist groups].”12   
 In regard to the rhetorical issues raised by the phrase “War on Terror,” 
there are at least three points to be made: (1) the U.S. is not in a war against 
terror, (2) but it is at war, and (3) it is a war against non–state actors, which 
may increasingly represent the future of war as we witness the continued 
breakdown of sovereignty and statehood around the world.  
I.  THE “WAR ON TERROR” 
 The word “war” is officially avoided in international matters that, in fact, 
relate to war.  In 1928 the Kellogg–Briand Pact13 renounced war as a 
method or a use of national policy. In 1949, what had been the U.S. War 
Department became the U.S. Department of Defense. The UN Charter 
begins with the purpose “to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war;” but, in Article II, Subsection 4, the signers of the Charter agree to 
“refrain in their international relations [from] the threat or the use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”14  
Instead of “war,” the operative term becomes “use of force.” 
 According to some, the language of Article 2(4) restricts the war power 
of member states by substituting UN Police Action:15  
 As a textual matter, it is obvious on its face that the Charter, in creating 
the new  police power, intended to establish an exclusive alternative to the 
old war system.   The old system was retained only as a fallback, available 
when the new system could not be made to work; not as an equal alternative 
to be chosen at the sole  discretion of the members.16  
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 14. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
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Even a nation’s right to self–defense is supposedly limited.17  
Nevertheless,  
“the legal basis for [U.S.] military operations in Afghanistan has never 
been controversial, either internationally or domestically. The [State 
Department] Legal Adviser’s office had no difficulty in establishing that 
we had a right to use force in self-defense against al Qaeda and any 
government supporting it, as well as any related terrorist organizations.”18  
 The term “use of force” by international lawyers and diplomats does not 
communicate well to the American public.  In communicating with other 
nations, the State Department’s Legal Office uses the terminology of the 
UN Charter, which refers to “use of force.”  The “wars” in Afghanistan and 
Iraq were approved by two documents written in part by the State 
Department, both labeled “Authorization for the Use of Military Force.” 
Many Americans, however, want to know: where is the declaration of war? 
Not only right–wing Republicans, but doves on war issues insist that the 
Constitution’s war power rests with Congress, not the United Nations.19 All 
need clarity about, “who is the enemy?” The lawyers worry primarily about 
judges and diplomats focus on other nations, but both need to realize that 
their legal rhetoric combined with the ambiguous political rhetoric about a 
“War on Terror” fails to communicate a coherent message to the public. 
 This confusion affects not only laymen, but also federal judges. When 
federal judges hear the term “War on Terror,” some must wonder whether 
what is involved is a clearly defined war or a real war that is ambiguously 
and propagandistically defined.  Americans have become all too familiar 
with phony wars: the “war on poverty,” the “war on drugs,” and more 
broadly the “war on crime.” Such wars never end. To the extent that judges 
get the impression that the War on Terror is like other domestic “wars,” 
they are more likely to view the War on Terror as another extension of the 
“war on crime,” which should be treated as a law enforcement matter to be 
adjudged in regular courts. 
 Within the framework of the Constitution, war is primarily committed to 
the political branches, while the judiciary oversees the criminal justice 
system. So the challengers to the Bush Administration’s policies effectively 
used a criminal justice model and an expanded rule of law—based on 
international law—to persuade a majority of the Supreme Court to view the 
issues as more in terms of law enforcement, rather than of war. Of course, 
the arguments of the challengers also played to the general inclination 
among most of that majority to expand federal judicial power.  
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 Nevertheless, if the Bush Administration had publicly made the war more 
clearly one against specific groups, rather than one generically against 
“terror,” it might have had some impact on the cases it lost in the Supreme 
Court beginning with Rasul.  Some justices seem to be influenced by public 
perceptions, rather than simply the facts and the law. Moreover, the 
rhetorical failures of the Bush Administration aided Justice Ginsburg, who 
had already made it clear that she hoped to change the then–current law and 
limit presidential power abroad.20  
II.  DEFINING WAR 
 While diplomatic use of the term “war” has declined in describing the 
military acts of nations, the word has invaded the discussion of domestic 
issues. Politicians are continually “waging war” against their political 
opponents by declaring wars against “enemies” of the people: poverty, 
drugs, or crime in general. Politicians need to address poverty, drugs, and 
crime, but packaging government policies as a “war” against poverty or 
drugs or crime is purely propagandistic. Politicians seem to declare war 
only on those problems that everyone knows cannot be completely 
conquered. They may think that communicating their commitment can 
substitute for competently addressing the particular problem. Propagandistic 
application of “war” to domestic policy, however, cheapens the significance 
of sacrifices resulting from the horrors of war.   
 Such propaganda confuses war with domestic policy. Domestic law 
enforcement, with its increased use of SWAT teams, has come to resemble 
military action. Actual war directs the forces of the country against another 
country or identifiable group, “the enemy.” Although it can happen in 
domestic law enforcement, especially with respect to organized crime and 
drug dealers, law enforcement ought not to be viewing other citizens—even 
criminals—as the “enemy.” To the extent that does happen, it can foster an 
attitude that the requirements of due process should differ for domestic 
“enemies” just as traditionally they have for enemies in war. At least until 
recently, soldiers have not been reading Miranda rights to captured 
prisoners.21 Until relatively recently, the FBI has not had offices around the 
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world. Increasingly, it is difficult to distinguish some types of police actions 
from military actions.  
 Prior to September 11th, without really considering the implications, the 
U.S. was treating acts of terrorism originating abroad as if they were 
criminal acts. Either Justice Department officials had not thought through 
the difference between internal acts and external acts of violence directed 
against the United States, or the natural bureaucratic desire to expand its 
jurisdiction and to demonstrate its competence moved the Department of 
Justice to reach beyond its jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the Constitutional 
focus of many federal law enforcement officials is limited to the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 
 Federal law enforcement officials demonstrate little understanding that 
the Constitution addresses the challenges posed by sovereignty by treating 
differently the external sovereignty of the nation and the internal division of 
powers.22 Separation of powers and federalism mean that no branch of the 
federal government, nor the states, are truly sovereign in the sense of having 
all power.  Each is sovereign in certain spheres.  Externally, however, the 
nation has total sovereignty vis–à–vis other nations. In the Constitution’s 
allocation of powers, the Executive is strongest during the course of foreign 
wars,23 but relatively weak compared to Congress on domestic matters.24  
 As indicated above in the remarks of John Bellinger, 25 modern rules of 
international law do not adequately address the challenges posed by 
international terrorism. Those remarks suggest that international rules might 
need to be changed. But in which direction? International law, as well as 
domestic law, takes shape according to an understanding of sovereignty. 
Often, lawyers are so focused on the rules in the trees that they miss the 
larger picture of the sovereign forest. Certainly, those who are determined 
that the UN Charter should become an effective limit on U.S. sovereignty 
and its ability to make decisions regarding war see the larger picture of 
sovereignty.26 
 Those who wish to maintain the sovereign power of the U.S.—pursuant 
to the Constitution—to declare and conduct war would do well to revisit the 
framework of international law that shaped the Framers. It rests in political 
thought about sovereignty and war. Grotius, the first modern writer on 
international law, recognized the need for rules of war.27 He wrote his 
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treatise on war right before the end of the Thirty Years War by the Treaties 
of Westphalia,28 which effectively borrowed from him. This was the time 
when nations began to emerge as sovereign states. Although political bodies 
existing prior to that time are often referred to as states; the modern state did 
not exist until after 1648.29 
 Grotius’ treatise, and others that followed, established an intellectual 
framework for the “law of nations” based on reason, custom, and 
conventional agreement to govern the relationships among sovereign 
states.30 They made distinctions that seem to be lost on us today, but these 
would be worth recovering. For instance, Grotius said that war is not simply 
the use of force—he avoided the term later used in the UN. He said that war 
involves more than the use of force; it referred to a state of affairs. War, he 
said, depends on certain authorities and actors.31  
 Grotius identified three classes of war: public war, private war, and 
mixed war.32 These classes are based on who the actors are. The class of war 
most apt to this discussion is the mixed war. On one side, there is a 
sovereign state, e.g. the United States. On the other side, there are non–state 
actors, e.g. the particular terrorist groups. This may be a phenomenon new 
to recent memory, but it is not entirely new. Before the nation–state, there 
were no states to engage in war; nonetheless, there were plenty of wars. 
There were wars between princes; there were wars between tribes; there 
were wars between other peoples. The fact that war is between groups that 
do not share the same common political bond is at the very essence of war. 
This notion has been lost, and failure to recover this will lead to continuing 
confusion. 
III.  FUTURE WARS 
 Increasingly, we see a world in which weak states are becoming failed 
states. Central America, in particular, comes to mind. Gangs trafficking in 
drugs, arms, and aliens are consolidating their power. Though Central 
American states may not yet experience the chaos of a Somalia, a failed 
state at its worst, they are confronted by armed groups that have more 
firepower—and often more money—than the legitimate governments. There 
is little reason to think that these problems will not worsen. Indeed, Mexico, 
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which did not seem to be in the same category, finds itself battling—but 
unable to break—the firepower of its drug cartels.33 
 De facto sovereignty requires the ability of the central power of a nation–
state to control the territory within its borders.  The sovereignty of nation–
states in Europe derives originally from rulers who funded armies through 
borrowing and taxation and dominated the use of weapons and information. 
The U.S. Constitution reflects the different vision of Americans, who 
wanted to avoid mercenary armies, high taxation, and the control of 
weapons and information.  The Internet, cheap information, and weapons 
technologies, however, make it possible for non–state actors to challenge 
any government—as demonstrated by the attacks of September 11th. Even 
the strong states of Western Europe would not have the ability to defend 
themselves if they were subjected to the same level of sustained attempts to 
attack them as the United States has experienced since September 11th. 
 The United States must be able to defend against various threats from all 
directions. Just imagine the consequences if the Mexican government is 
ultimately unsuccessful in battling the drug cartels. The U.S. could have at 
least a partially failed state with millions of people in the area just below its 
southern border. What would—what should—the U.S. do about it? Under 
the UN Charter, what could the U.S. ‘lawfully’ do about it? Unless a 
nation–state is attacked, the UN Charter would not seem to recognize the 
use of preemptive action as a matter of self–defense. Those who might say 
that the UN Charter would control even under those circumstances would 
have to ignore the most fundamental rights of a sovereign state to defend 
itself and its citizens. Until international law is rethought in light of these 
realities, the United States will only have the present, inadequate ways of 
dealing with the very serious challenges posed by violent non–state actors. 
 When it comes to a choice between defending the United States and 
suffering the criticism of world opinion, self–defense is the only reasonable 
decision for the U.S. The meaning of reasonableness assumes that two or 
more contradictory opinions on the same issue can both or all be reasonable.  
When the highest court in a nation’s legal system reverses a lower court, 
that does not necessarily mean that the opinion of the lower court was 
actually unreasonable; it only means that the opinion of the higher court is 
authoritative. It remains for others to judge whose opinion was more 
reasonable and whether either was unreasonable. 
 Outside a court system that is part of a sovereign state, the opinion of the 
higher court would not be authoritative. That does not mean—as a 
Hobbesian theory of absolute sovereignty would hold—that the will of the 
sovereign is not subject to the rule of law.  Although the rule of law is not 
derived from sovereign power, its implementation does depend on the 
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respect and cooperation of the sovereign power. In the United States, the 
Constitution implements the rule of law.  Other countries implement the 
rule of law in different, reasonable ways. In a world of equal sovereigns—
which still exist under the UN Charter—each State must ultimately decide 
the meaning of provisions in the UN Charter. If those opinions are not 
unreasonable, others should respect the reasons given even when they 
conflict with the opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
 Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser during the Reagan Administration, has 
talked about differences with the ICJ. “My views (and those of my 
predecessors) differed from the views of the current ICJ majority, and of 
most international law scholars, with regard to both the meaning of self–
defense, and whether a state may use force where it believes that a thorough 
evaluation of all the relevant considerations, in light of Charter’s purposes, 
establishes the use of force is reasonable.”34 Sofaer was referring to the 
ICJ’s decision in favor of Nicaragua and against the United States.35 “The 
ICJ narrowly construed the ‘inherent’ right of self–defense in Article 51 of 
the Charter in the Nicaragua litigation…. [t]his unprecedented and artificial 
interpretation of the UN Charter directly threatened the scope of the Reagan 
Doctrine and the U.S. efforts to assist other States defend against anti-
democratic insurgencies.”36 This “threat” led the U.S. to reject the ICJ’s 
interpretation. In doing so, did it violate “the law” when it was acting in 
accord with the U.S. Constitution and a reasonable understanding of the 
right of self–defense and the defense of others? 
 The United States will predictably always take a view of self–defense at 
odds with that expressed by the ICJ. The American view represents the 
traditional understanding of the law of nations, that a nation’s right of self–
defense is absolutely fundamental. This right depends not merely on the 
sovereignty of individual states. Like the natural right of every human 
being, national self–defense is not only a right; it is an obligation. It is a 
dictate of reasonableness and part of any sane understanding of the rule of 
law. It would be quite unreasonable to give up the right of self–defense, 
except for some greater good, which would only be to save the life of 
another person. Rejecting an ICJ opinion narrowing the fundamental right 
of self–defense is an action defending the rule of law.   
CONCLUSION 
 The present portends a future of continuing struggles with terrorists and 
other non–state actors of various descriptions from many parts of the world. 
Attacks will take new forms and need not actually be launched directly 
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against a state itself. Cyber attacks over the Internet launched by unknown 
persons and groups, acting alone or on behalf of a state, have the possibility 
of crippling a country by destroying its communications system. These 
destructive possibilities available to small groups are phenomena not 
anticipated when the UN Charter was drafted sixty–five years ago. 
  After 1648, the law of individual states and the law of nations developed 
based on a theory of sovereignty that accommodated and advanced the new 
structures of statehood. Today, there are those who believe the demise of 
sovereignty is inevitable and even desirable to make way for a new world 
order.  In fact, the theory of absolute sovereignty undergirding consolidated 
states may not last. It has only been around for about five hundred years.37 
But it will not be replaced by a utopia where international courts rule over a 
peaceful world under the rule of law, without being backed by some form of 
force. Given the undeniable failure of the UN and the Charter to establish a 
peaceful world—where only the UN uses force—it is more likely that the 
decline of state sovereignty translates into an increasing number of non–
state groups—better labeled tribes—that exercise de facto sovereignty over 
larger areas of the globe. Avoiding such international lawlessness will 
require considerable thought about the impact of technology and non–state 
actor attacks on the de facto sovereignty of nation–states. Also as reflected 
in the rhetoric of the War on Terror, the political leadership in the U.S. 
needs to have a clear and coherent intellectual defense of America’s 
sovereign, natural, and rule of law right to self–defense. 
 
  
 37. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 29. 
